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ABSTRACT
Ecosystem services are the specific results of ecosystem processes
that either directly sustain or enhance human life (as does natural
protection from the sun's harmful ultraviolet rays) or maintain the
quality of ecosystem goods (as water purification maintains the
quality of streamflow). "Ecosystem service" has come to represent
several related topics ranging from the measurement to the
marketing of ecosystem service flows. In this article we examine
several of these topics by first clarifying the meaning of "ecosystem
service" and then (1) placing ecosystem goods and services within
an economic framework, emphasizing the role and limitations of
substitutes; (2) summarizing the methods for valuation of ecosystem
goods and services; and (3) reviewing the various approaches for
their provision and financing.
Many ecosystem services and some ecosystem goods are received
without monetary payment. The "marketing" of ecosystem goods
and services is basically an effort to turn such recipients - those
who benefit without ownership- into buyers, thereby providing
market signals that serve to help protect valuable goods and
services. We review various formal arrangements for making this
happen.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Ecosystem service" is the latest environmental buzzword.1 It
appeals to ecologists, who have long recognized the many benefits derived
from well-functioning ecosystems. It appeals to resource economists, who
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endeavor to measure the value to humans of natural resources. And it
appeals to a host of others-public land managers and many private
landholders included-who see opportunities for a more efficient and
effective provision of basic environmental service flows. With all of this
interest, "ecosystem service" has quickly come to represent several related
topics, four of which are (1) the measurement of ecosystem service flows
and the processes underlying those flows, (2) understanding the effect of
those flows on human well-being, (3) valuation of the services, and (4)
provision of the services. Despite the breadth of purview, "ecosystem
service" brings a unique perspective to environmental dialog, one aimed at
using economic tools to improve opportunities for reaching efficient levels
of environmental protection.
Our purpose with this article is to summarize and bring some
clarity to discussions of ecosystem services. We begin by explaining what
"ecosystem service" means and how it fits within an economic context,
emphasizing the fundamental contribution of ecosystem goods and services
to human wellbeing, but also noting the importance of substitutes in
considering the benefits and costs of protecting ecosystems. Next we review
valuation of ecosystem goods and services. We then discuss provision and
financing, focusing on the conditions that facilitate market exchange and on
the various mechanisms that are now used to provide and protect
ecosystem goods and services.
II. WHAT IS AN ECOSYSTEM SERVICE?
Ecologist Gretchen Daily offered the following answer to this
question:
Ecosystem services are the conditions and processes through
which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them
up, sustain and fulfill human life. They maintain biodiversity
and the production of ecosystem goods, such as seafood, forage,
timber, biomass fuels, natural fiber, and many
pharmaceuticals, industrial products, and their
precursors....In addition to the production of goods,
ecosystem services are the actual life-support functions, such
as cleansing, recycling, and renewal, and they confer many
intangible aesthetic and cultural benefits as well.2
Daily's definition makes an important distinction, between
ecosystem services and ecosystem goods. Ecosystems goods are the
2. Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE'S SERVICES:
SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL EcOSYsTEMs 1, 3 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997).
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generally tangible, material products that result from ecosystem processes,
whereas ecosystem services are in most cases improvements in the
condition or location of things of value.3 Daily explains that ecosystem
services are generated by a "complex of natural cycles," from large-scale
biogeochemical cycles, such as the movement of carbon through the living
and physical environment, to the very small-scale life cycles of
microorganisms.4
Daily lists several ecosystem services, such as purification of water,
mitigation of floods, and pollination of plants. As she mentions, these
services "are absolutely pervasive, but unnoticed by most human beings
going about their daily lives."5 Unlike these ecosystem services, most
ecosystem goods do not go unnoticed, as they are the basic natural
resources that we consume on a regular basis. Ecosystem goods have long
been recognized as key elements of wealth; it is the grand contribution of
modem ecological and hydrological sciences to more fully recognize and
appreciate the services that nature also provides.
The tidy distinction between ecosystem services and ecosystem
goods was later obscured by Costanza et al.,6 who, after noting the
difference between goods and services, proceeded to lump them into the
class of "ecosystem services." This lumping had the advantage of brevity
but tended to blur the distinction between the functional nature of
ecosystem services and the concrete nature of ecosystem goods. This
lumping was adopted by others, including the United Nations' Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment. We will maintain the distinction between
ecosystem goods and services.
Daily's definition makes another key point about ecosystem
services: they "sustain and fulfill human life."8 The emphasis here is
squarely on human well-being and is thus in keeping with an economic
perspective. Some might say that such an anthropocentric focus is too
limiting-that it devalues the importance of ecosystem structure and
processes to species other than humans, or that it runs the risk of ignoring
3. Like most dichotomies-and the reader will encounter several in the course of this
article - the distinction between goods and services is not without exceptions or complications.
For example, recreation opportunities do not fit neatly into either category, as they are neither
tangible items (as are water, trees, and fish) nor improvements in conditions of goods (as are
water purification, flood mitigation, and pollination). We classify recreation opportunities as
goods.
4. Daily, supra note 2, at 4.
5. Id. at 3-5.
6. Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,
387 NATURE 253, 253 (1997).
7. JOSEPH ALCAMO ET AL., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ASSESSMENT 55-57 (2003) (also known as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment).
8. Daily, supra note 2 at 3.
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ecosystem processes that contribute to human welfare but are not yet
recognized as doing so. Clearly a focus on ecosystem services may turn out,
through hubris or ignorance, to have been shortsighted, but, on the other
hand, this focus is a vast improvement over business as usual and provides
an opening for even greater consideration of ecosystem processes as our
understanding of the natural world improves.
Where we differ with Daily's definition is that we, as have others,9
draw a distinction between ecosystem services and ecosystem processes.
Ecosystem processes (also sometimes called functions) are the complex
physical and biological cycles and interactions that underlie what we
observe as the natural world. Ecosystem services are the specific results of
those processes that either directly sustain or enhance human life (as does
natural protection from the sun's harmful ultraviolet [UVI rays) or maintain
the quality of ecosystem goods (as water purification maintains the quality
of streamflow). For example, the forces of wind and water, made possible
by solar energy and gravity, produce the service we call "translocation of
nutrients." Similarly, microorganisms in the soil and stream, seeking their
own sources of energy and life-preserving conditions, remove contaminants
from water, producing the service "water purification."
Although the difference between processes and services is more
than semantic, it may not always seem so, especially when the term used to
summarize a process is only slightly different from the term used to
characterize the service. For example, the process by which water infiltrates
into watershed soils, is stored in those soils, and is later released
downstream, known as "regulation of hydrologic flows," produces the
service "water regulation."" The shorthand labels we attach to processes
and services must not be allowed to blur the distinction between processes
and the services they perform.
Table 1 lists ecosystem goods and services. Ecosystem goods are
grouped in two broad categories: renewable and nonrenewable. The
nonrenewable ecosystem goods can only be used up, although recycling
allows for some recapture and reuse. Renewable ecosystem goods can be
received in perpetuity if the stock is managed in a sustained yield fashion
(i.e., harvest equals growth). Of course, a stock of renewable resources can
be harvested at a rate faster than its natural growth or replenishment rate.
In the limit, the entire stock of a renewable resource, such as a timber stand
9. See, e.g., Boyd & Banzhaf, supra note 1, at 17; Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 253;
Rudolf S. de Groot et al., A Typology for the Classification, Description and Valuation of Ecosystem
Functions, Goods and Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL EcoN. 393, 394 (2002).
10. Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 254 tbl.1 (listing a number of ecosystem service-
function pairs).
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or fish population, could be converted to an ecosystem good and consumed
in one brief period.
Table 1. Ecosystem Goods & Services
Ecosystem goods
Nonrenewable
Rocks and minerals
Fossil fuels
Renewable
Wildlife and fish (food, furs, viewing)
Plants (food, fiber, fuel, medicinal herbs)
Water
Air
Soils
Recreation, aesthetic (e.g., landscape beauty), and educational
opportunities
Ecosystem services
Purification of air and water (detoxification and decomposition of
wastes)
Translocation of nutrients
Maintenance and renewal of soil and soil fertility
Pollination of crops and natural vegetation
Dispersal of seeds
Maintenance of regional precipitation patterns
Erosion control
Maintenance of habitats for plants and animals
Control of pests affecting plants or animals (including humans)
Protection from the sun's harmful UV rays
Partial stabilization of climate
Moderation of temperature extremes and the force of winds and
waves
Mitigation of floods and droughts
The ecosystem services of Table 1 are similar to those listed by
Daily,1 with some additions and deletions. The services result from an
assortment of complex, sometimes interacting, physical and biological
processes, touching many aspects of human life, including the air we
breathe, the water we drink, our food, the weather, our health, and our
outdoor recreation possibilities.
11. Daily, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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We define ecosystem goods and services generally as the flows
from an ecosystem that are of relatively immediate benefit to humans and
occur naturally.12 As shown in Figure 1, ecosystem goods and services result
specifically from ecosystem structure and processes. Ecosystem structure
refers to the abiotic and biotic components of an ecosystem and the
ecological connections among these components. Ecosystem process refers to
the cycles and interactions among those abiotic and biotic components,
which produce ecosystem goods and services. The feedbacks in Figure 1
represent both the negative impacts of human actions on the ecosystem and
human efforts to protect and manage the ecosystem. The ways in which
ecosystem structure and processes generate ecosystem goods and services
(e.g., the natural production or transformation functions) are primarily
biological and physical scientists' areas of interest and expertise. The values
and provision of ecosystem goods and services that enter directly into
consumers' utility functions and also indirectly as inputs into economic
production are primarily economists' areas of interest and expertise and the
focus of the following sections of this article.
As a final point of clarification, we note that the goods and services
of Table I derive from more than just the "ecosystem." Indeed, they include
nonrenewable resources that accumulated through geologic processes that
took millions of years, as well as services that involve global hydrologic and
climatic systems. Herein, we will continue with the convention of referring
to all of these as "ecosystem" goods and services.
III. ECOSYSTEM GOODS AND SERVICES WITHIN AN
ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Current discussions of ecosystem goods and services focus on
recognizing the benefits that humans derive from a well-functioning
ecosystem. Benefits may be understood from various perspectives,
including the physiological, the psychological, and, our focus here, the
economic. We first consider how ecosystem goods and services fit within
an economic theory framework.
12. Not all taxonomies of ecosystem services limit them to naturally occurring goods and
services. For example, among its set of ecosystem services, the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment includes produced commodities such as agricultural crops. ALCAMO ET AL., supra
note 7, at 56. We limit "ecosystem services" to naturally occurring goods and services; that is,
those that exist without human action.
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A. The Traditional Roles of Land and Natural Resources in Economic
Theory
In the aggregate (macroeconomic) production function or growth
model for an economy of the classical economists, the total set of goods and
services is produced as a function of land, labor, and capital. Capital refers
to produced means of production, such as buildings, tools, roads, and
vehicles. Land, the pivotal factor of production to most classical economists,
included the entire natural world of land, sea, and atmosphere, although
land and agriculture were the primary focus. 13
Figure 1. Relationship between the ecosystem and the human system
13. Klaus Hubacek & Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Changing Concepts of "Land" in
Economic Theory: From Single to Multi-Disciplinary Approaches, 56 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 5,6 (2006).
David Ricardo and Karl Marx were exceptions for whom labor was considered the primary
source of wealth.
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This aggregate model underwent changes over the years, including
a de-emphasis of the land inputs by the neoclassical school, largely in the
first half of the twentieth century, 4 and a re-emphasis on land inputs by
environmental economists in the second half of the twentieth century."5
Other changes that occurred in recent years have been the broadening of the
concepts of land and labor. Since the early 1990s, the stock of natural
resources important for economic production sometimes has been referred
to as "natural capital" rather than "land." 6 This new term encompasses the
earth's surface, its species, the nonliving material stocks of the earth's crust,
the atmosphere, and even the sun, the source of solar radiation from which
input flows are extracted.17 "Natural capital" returns us to the classical
understanding of "land," but with an even richer appreciation of its many
different components, as scientific discovery has expanded our knowledge
of the natural world. Similarly, the meaning of "labor" has been broadened
to include both the knowledge that people bring to the production process
and the institutional and social networks (e.g., laws, educational systems,
and practices of child upbringing) that underlie the formation of a trained
labor force. It is now common to refer to labor and the familial and
institutional processes that support it as "human capital." This new
formulation of the aggregate production function - where total production
of an economy is a function of natural capital, human capital, and built
capital -recognizes the importance of the processes underlying inputs of
immediate concern (i.e., natural resources and labor) in production of goods
and services.
14. By the middle of the twentieth century, land for some economists had essentially
disappeared from the production function. Solow, for example, used a production function
with no natural or land inputs, stating, "the production function is homogeneous of first
degree. This amounts to assuming.. .no scarce nonagumentable resource like land." Robert M.
Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65, 67 (1956), quoted in
Richard W. England, Natural Capital and the Theory of Economic Growth, 34 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
425, 426 (2000).
15. The de-emphasis of land by the neoclassical economists, plus a general lack of interest
in externalities, set the stage for the rise of environmental economics in the 1960s and 1970s,
which formally recognized the importance and uniqueness of natural resources in economic
production and growth. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship
Earth, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrTy IN A GROWING ECONOMY 3 (Henry Jarrett ed., 1966);
NICHoLAS GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, THE ENTROPY LAW AND THE ECONOMIC PROCESS (1971); ALLEN
V. KNEESE & BLAIR T. BOWER, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT: REPORT
OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM ON ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS (1979);
JOHN V. KRUTILLA & ANTHONY C. FISHER, THE ECONOMIcS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS: STUDIES
IN THE VALUATION OF COMMODITY AND AMENITY RESOURCES (1975).
16. HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING THE
ECONOMYTOWARD COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND ASUSTAINABLE FUTURE 72-73 (2nd ed.
1994).
17. England, supra note 14, at 427.
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Moving to a microeconomic perspective, we may focus on the
inputs and outputs in specific locations. At this level, produced goods and
services of direct utility to humans result from inputs of ecosystem goods
and services, labor, and built capital.18 Each of these inputs is in turn the
result of production processes. Ecosystem goods and services result from
ecosystem processes that act on natural capital. An example of an ecosystem
good is natural instream flow, which, via ecological and hydrologic
processes, is derived from natural capital in the form of precipitation,
terrain, soils, aquifers, and biota (plants and animals) found in the
ecosystem.19 Inputs of labor to a production process result from the
structure and processes of human systems. Finally, inputs of produced
capital result from economic production functions utilizing ecosystem
goods and services, labor, and other built capital.
It is important to note that the production of ecosystem goods and
services requires no inputs of labor and built capital, except in the sense that
in today's complex world ecosystem processes are often damaged by
human endeavors and are left to do their work relatively unimpeded by
human enterprise only through conscious decisions to protect the
ecosystem (Figure 1). However, unlike ecosystem goods and services,
production of labor requires not only human capital but also inputs of
ecosystem goods and services and of produced capital.
To summarize, each of the components of the production of final
goods and services is the result of production functions and underlying
processes of their own: ecosystem goods and services result from ecological
production functions, labor results from human production functions, and
built capital results from economic production functions. But ecosystem
goods and services require inputs from natural capital only, whereas labor
and built capital require inputs from the ecosystem, labor, and built capital.
Thus, final produced goods and services rely on ecosystem goods and
services directly and indirectly via their contribution to labor and built
capital.
18. For example, production of apples requires ecosystem goods such as soil and water
plus ecosystem services such as renewal of soil fertility and pollination; labor, including the
grower's knowledge and work; and capital such as the grower's tools as well as seeds and
pesticides.
19. Nonrenewable ecosystem goods, such as gold or oil, are a special case. Here the
ecosystem functions of interest played their roles over thousands or millions of years past,
operating in cycles that take so long relative to our life spans that we think of the goods as
nonrenewable.
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B. Ecosystem Good or Service Value Concepts
From an economic perspective, things are of value if they are of
utility to humans. Among the basic factors of production, ecosystem goods
and services are unique in that they may be of either direct utility or
indirect utility as they contribute to the production of produced goods and
services that are in turn of direct utility. Ecosystem goods and services that
are of direct utility include, for example, the air we breathe, natural
temperatures, UV protection, and a landscape view. As seen above, all
produced goods and services require some inputs of ecosystem goods and
services. 2°
All of the ecosystem services of Table 1 contribute to the
maintenance or quality of one or more of the renewable ecosystem goods
of the table. For example, purification of air maintains air quality,
pollination and seed dispersal assist the propagation of wild plants, and
maintenance of precipitation patterns assists water supply as well as natural
plant and animal survival. In addition, several of the ecosystem services,
especially the bottom five on the list, can directly affect utility. For example,
moderation of temperature extremes, protection from harmful UV rays, and
natural pest control all directly enter the utility function.
In cases where the ecosystem service is not directly consumed,
there is a derived demand for the ecosystem service and thus for the
processes and the natural capital (e.g., ecosystem structure) required to
support ecosystem processes. For example, to produce a drink of water
while on a hike, we directly use the instream flow, not the natural
production or transformation functions (e.g., ecosystem processes) that
produce the flow. Similarly, to produce a fishing trip, an angler combines
a recreation opportunity (including instream flow and a fish population),
labor (e.g., effort, fishing skills), and built capital (e.g., boat, fishing gear) to
produce a fishing experience. The essential point here is that ecosystem
goods and services are the components of the natural world that enter our
utility function either directly, or indirectly as inputs in the production of
final goods and services.
20. The dichotomy between ecosystem goods and services of direct versus indirect utility
is somewhat artificial in that there is a continuum from those ecosystem goods and services
that require little or no other inputs to be of direct utility to humans to those that require a
great deal. Ecosystem goods requiring small amounts of labor and built capital include such
things as instream flow for drinking by a hiker and wild mushrooms ready for picking. Only
travel to and from the site and minimal harvest effort are needed to enjoy such goods.
Examples of ecosystem goods that require much more labor or built capital are timber, which
must be cut, hauled, and milled before it becomes lumber, and crude oil, which must be
pumped, transported, and refined before it becomes gasoline.
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The various pathways by which ecosystem goods and services
affect utility are depicted in Figure 2. Ecosystem services can directly affect
utility (pathway 1), maintain the quality of ecosystem goods (2), or be used
in the production of manufactured or agricultural goods (3). Examples of
(1) include protection from harmful UV rays and maintenance of air quality.
Examples of (3) include pollination of agricultural crops and protection of
the quality of streamflow that is diverted, treated, and delivered for human
use. Renewable ecosystem goods can affect utility directly (4) or act as
inputs in the production of goods (5) that then directly affect utility (8).
Examples of such ecosystem goods include a beautiful landscape view and
timber, respectively. Nonrenewable ecosystem goods, such as oil, serve as
inputs in the production of produced goods (6). Built capital and labor are
also used in the production of produced goods (7).
Figure 2. Pathways from Ecosystem Goods & Services to Utility (not
including use of ecosystem goods and services in the production of built
capital and labor)
1
9 Reniewble 4
3
Spring 2007]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
C. Substitute Relationships
The relative quantities of ecosystem goods and services, labor, and
built capital that are required to produce a good or service are to some
extent substitutable. To take farming as an example, a farmer may
substitute capital (in the form of tractors and combines) for labor. Many
ecosystem goods and services have similar substitutes in the form of built
capital and produced goods and services. For example, considering
ecosystem goods, mushrooms may be cultivated, and fir or pine timber for
wooden studs may be replaced with iron manufactured into metal studs
(see the right-hand column of Table 2). Or, considering ecosystem services,
the waste assimilation properties of natural watersheds can be replaced
with a waste treatment plant (a form of built capital), and natural pest
control can be replaced by pesticides. Of course, all of these produced
substitutes require inputs including other ecosystem goods or services, but
this does not negate the fact that substitutes generally exist.2'
It is the nature of economic and population growth that some
ecosystem goods and services become depleted and that humans use their
technological prowess along with inputs including more plentiful
ecosystem goods and services to produce new built capital and goods that
compensate for such depletion. Of particular interest is whether the cost of
producing substitutes for ecosystem goods and services exceeds the
opportunity cost of protecting the original ecosystem goods and services.
For example, healthy watersheds control the amount of sediment that enters
stream drainage networks during precipitation events and perform natural
waste assimilation, keeping costs low for downstream water treatment and
delivery. The recent focus on ecosystem services has been in large part an
effort to bring attention to the economic importance of natural ecosystems
and to the fact that when ecosystems are degraded replacement of lost
services, if possible, is often only feasible with more costly substitute
investments of human and built capital and other ecosystem goods and
services. 22
21. That is, substitutes to specific ecosystem goods or services are partly composed of or
rely on other ecosystem goods and services, although perhaps of a different class (e.g., wooden
studs rely on a renewable resource whereas metal studs rely on a nonrenewable, though
recyclable, resource). In addition to these inputs, the substitutes generally also require
technological know-how and, in many cases, manufacturing plants (e.g., a waste treatment
plant or pesticide production facility). Like natural ecosystems, such engineered systems have
limited capacities and fail to function if overloaded.
22. See Costanza et al., supra note 6, at 257. See also ALCAMO Er AL., supra note 7, at 64.
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Although substitutes abound for many ecosystem goods and
services, it is important to note that such substitutes are rarely perfect. To
examine this point, consider New York City's oft-cited decision to protect
its Catskill watershed water source in lieu of constructing an expensive
water filtration plant. 3 Both watershed protection and a filtration plant can
provide clean water, but these two approaches to reaching the goal of
potable water differ markedly, each approach having advantages and
disadvantages. For example, watershed protection will lower the use of
chemicals in the watershed that pose problems even with the most
sophisticated water treatment plants, but filtration is more certain to
remove pathogens.24 The differences between the original ecosystem good
or service and produced substitutes are even more obvious for many of the
examples listed in Table 2. For example, artificial pesticides are typically
more effective than natural pest control but they pose health risks that
natural pest control does not. Similarly, backpacking in a roaded area of
national forest is an imperfect substitute for backpacking in a wilderness
area. Differences between the original and the substitute are always a
matter of degree, and must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
A further point, important when the benefits of environmental
protection are being considered, is that ecosystems typically produce
23. GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE QUEST
TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE 61-85 (2002); GEOFFREY M. HEAL Er AL., NAT'L RES.
COUNCIL, COMM. ON ASSESSING & VALUING THE SERVICES OF AQUATIC & RELATED TERRESTRIAL
ECOSYSTEMS, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-
MAKING 159-60 (2005). Relying on water from nearly 2000 square miles of watershed, New
York City's water system provides potable water to over nine million people. Because of past
efforts at watershed protection, a series of city-owned reservoirs that allowed long detention
times and flexibility in meeting demands, and the low population density in the watersheds,
the city avoided the need for a filtration plant. However, economic growth in the watershed
and related concerns about rising pathogen concentrations brought increased pressures for
filtration, leading to a 1997 agreement between the city and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). With the agreement, the city avoided the high cost of filtration, estimated at
from $4 to $8 billion plus annual operating costs of approximately $300 million. HEAL Er AL.,
supra, at 157. Instead, the city is investing roughly $2 billion over several years to protect the
quality of the water entering the city's water treatment plants. Components of the investment
include (1) upgrading wastewater treatment plants that the city operates for upstream
communities; (2) rehabilitating and upgrading city-owned dams and water supply facilities;
(3) purchasing land and conservation easements in the watershed; (4) funding various efforts
of non-City entities, such as local government inspection and rehabilitation of septic systems,
improvements of sewer systems, better stormwater management, environmental education,
stream corridor protection, and improved storage of sand, salt, and deicing materials; (5) paying
farmers to follow best management practices; and (6) enhanced monitoring. In addition, the
agreement places restrictions in the watershed on the operation of wastewater treatment plants,
siting of new wastewater treatment plants, construction of new septic systems, and storage of
petroleum products and hazardous substances. DAILY & ELLISON, supra.
24. HEAL ET AL., supra note 23, at 159-60.
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multiple ecosystem goods and services, many of which may be harmed if
the ecosystem is degraded. For example, healthy watersheds not only
protect water quality but also maintain aquatic habitats that are critical for
fish and other organisms and for recreation. The degradation of a natural
ecosystem may lead to a whole list of required replacements. If, as in the
Catskill watershed case, protecting the ecosystem is less expensive than the
engineered substitute for only one of the ecosystem's services, the other
protected goods and services need not complicate the decision about
whether to protect the ecosystem. However, if for a particular goal the
engineered substitute were less expensive than watershed protection, the
other benefits of watershed protection would need to be considered in order
to allow a full comparison of costs and benefits.
IV. VALUATION OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
The economic value of something is a measure of its contribution
to human well-being.2 Economic values reflect the preferences and actions
of people in a society, who are assumed to behave so as to maximize their
well-being given the constraints they face. Clearly such values are largely
based on an instrumental view of nature and on the assumption that
individuals are competent judges of what is in their best interests. These
premises are arguable, and much has been written about alternative
approaches to value and about the inadequacies of human decision making.
However, even with its flaws, quantification of economic values can, and
regularly does, provide useful information for public decisions, especially
when the limitations as well as the strengths of the values are recognized.
25. See generally A. Myrick Freeman, III, Economic Valuation: What and Why, in A PRIMER
ON NON-MARKET VALUATION 1 (Patricia A. Champ et al. eds., 2003) (providing background on
the role of economic valuation in assessing policies and on the nature, definition, and
measurement of economic values). Economic value is a type of "assigned" value, assigned
value being the relative importance or worth of something to a person or group in a particular
context. Thomas C. Brown, The Concept of Value in Resource Allocation, 60 LAND ECON. 231, 233
(1984). Assigned value is one of several value realms, others being held value (an enduring
conception of the preferable that influences choice and action, such as honesty and beauty) and
functional value (dealing with biological or physical relationships of one non-human entity to
another). When ecologists talk of, for example, the value of riparian vegetation in controlling
stream temperature or the value of nitrogen in tree growth, they are talking of functional value.
Functional values exist whether or not we are aware of them and are the object of scientific
discovery. Assigned and held values are indications of human preference, and are an object
of investigation by economists and psychologists, among others. See id. at 231-34.
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A. Role of Economic Valuation
It is legitimate to ask, why bother to estimate the economic value
of ecosystem goods and services? Surely it cannot be done perfectly, and
even if it could, doesn't reducing the value of ecosystem goods and services
to a monetary metric somehow downplay their real or full values? The
answer to these questions is that decisions are commonly made about
whether to protect or degrade ecosystem goods and services, and those
decisions are more likely to be made in the best interests of the relevant
publics if decision makers have comparable information about what is
gained and what is lost if a certain policy option is chosen.26 Monetary
estimates of the values of ecosystem goods or services, even if inexact, may
be far better than a complete lack of such estimates, especially if the
direction of the error in estimation - whether the value estimate is taken to
be a lower bound or an upper bound of the actual value, for example- is
known.
Economic valuation has a greater chance of providing an accurate
estimate of value if the ecosystem change being evaluated is small relative
to the total production of the good or service in the geographical area of
interest. For example, it is easier to value a small change in water yield than
to value a large change. This is because existing prices indicate the marginal
value of the resource, and the marginal value applies best to a small change
in quantity or quality. Large reductions would typically be undervalued if
the entire change were valued at the marginal value. Fortunately, most
realistic policy changes cause only relatively small changes in the
production of a given ecosystem good or service.
Economic values may be used as input to benefit-cost analysis or to
cost effectiveness analysis. With benefit-cost analysis, the benefits of a
prospective policy change are compared with the costs. For example, if the
prospective policy change is the commercial development of a wetland, the
benefits of the development (perhaps estimated as the market price of the
land once the wetland is filled in and the land is thus available for
development) are compared with the costs (estimated as the cost of infilling
plus the loss in ecosystem services provided by the wetland). With cost
effectiveness analysis, a decision has already been made to provide some
good or service (i.e., it has essentially been decided that the costs, whatever
they are, are less than the benefits), and the task is to determine the most
cost effective way to provide the benefits. The New York City water supply
case cited above exemplifies this situation, where the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), via amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act,
mandates water quality standards and the city considered the option of
26. See, e.g., HEAL ET AL., supra note 23, at 27, 97.
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protecting its Catskill watershed source in lieu of constructing and
maintaining a filtration plant.17 Because the city must meet EPA standards,
the issue is whether building and operating a filtration plant, or protecting
the source watershed, is less expensive.
B. Dimensions of Economic Value
The economic value of an ecosystem good or service may consist
of both use and nonuse values. Use value may result from either direct or
indirect use.28 Direct use involves some form of direct physical interaction
with the good or service. With ecosystem goods, direct use may be
consumptive (e.g., hunting) or non-consumptive (e.g., bird watching).
Consumptive uses involve some form of extraction or harvesting, whereas
non-consumptive use leaves the quantity of the good or service
undiminished. However, non-consumptive uses may affect the quality of
the resource or service, perhaps by pollution or crowding. Indirect use
involves ecosystem services that contribute to the quality of an ecosystem
good or a produced good. For example, natural water purification that
occurs in a watershed contributes to the quality of the streamflow, and
natural pollination of crops enhances the farmer's yield.
Nonuse value, also called passive use value, arises for ecosystem
goods or services that people value simply for their existence. Nonuse value
can be thought of as the difference between total value and use value -if
use of the good or service is impossible but total value remains positive, the
remaining value is nonuse value. Bequest value, the value of knowing that
the resource will be available for others, including future generations, is a
form of nonuse value, but bequest motives are not a necessary condition for
nonuse value. Nonuse values can be substantial but are difficult to
quantify.29
The economic value of something to an individual is the maximum
amount the person would pay to get it (willingness to pay, WTP), or the
minimum amount he or she would accept to give it up (willingness to
accept compensation, WTA). Maximum WTP for a gain is the payment
amount that leaves the individual just as well off as before the trade.
Similarly, minimum WTA for a loss is the amount of compensation that
leaves the individual just as well off as before the trade.' The choice of WTP
27. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
28. See supra Part M.A.
29. HEAL ET AL., supra note 23, at 47, 142.
30. These measures assume that the individual has a right to her current utility level.
Other possible economic measures are WTP to avoid a loss (which leaves the individual at a
lower utility level) and WTA to give up a gain (which leaves the individual at a higher utility
level). See Nicholas E. Flores, Conceptual Framework for Nonmarket Valuation, in A PRIMER ON
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or WTA as the measure of something depends on whether or not the person
has property rights to it. For private goods, property rights are generally
well-established, but for public goods, environmental conditions, or goods
available on public land, property rights are not so obvious or easily
established. For example, the right to a certain level of streamflow quantity
and quality along a river, say to a person with property along the river or
to a kayaker who floats the river, is a complicated matter of state and
federal law. The difficulty over property rights would matter little if WTP
did not differ from WTA. In some cases, such as when close substitutes to
the good or service at issue are not available, WTA can substantially exceed
WTP.3 Lack of close substitutes may easily be the case with some ecosystem
goods or services, such as unique recreation and educational opportunities
or maintenance of habitats for endangered species. Unfortunately, WTA is
often difficult to measure, so consequently WTP is often used even where
WTA would be more appropriate; resulting in an underestimate of value.32
An underestimate may still be a useful input to a policy decision, as long as
it is recognized as a lower bound on the true value.
C. Methods for Valuing Ecosystem Goods and Services
Four principal categories of methods are available for valuation of
ecosystem goods and services:
* Household revealed preference methods, including the
travel cost, hedonic, and averting behavior methods
• Stated preference methods, including contingent valuation
and attribute-based methods
• Production function methods
• Replacement cost method.
We will briefly describe these methods.33
The first two categories focus on individual choices and
preferences, based on the fundamental assumption that individuals act so
as to maximize their utility (thus providing true indications of value).
Household Revealed preference methods utilize the observed behavior
of individuals as indicators of their WTP for an environmental attribute or
condition. These methods rely on a complementary relationship between
NON-MARKET VALUATION, supra note 25, at 27, 38.
31. W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can
They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635, 637 (1991).
32. HEAL ET AL., supra note 23, at 49.
33. For more detail on the full set of methods, see HEAL Er AL., id. at 95-152. For a more
thorough description of the first two categories, see A PRIMER ON NON-MARKET VALUATION,
supra note 25. For more detail on production function methods in the context of water
resources, see ROBERT A. YOUNG, DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER: CONCEPTS
AND METHODS 50-117 (2005). Many other sources are available that give thorough descriptions.
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a market good and the nonmarket good or service at issue. The travel cost
method uses travel to recreation sites, and the costs of that travel, to infer
the WTP for the recreation visits. With data for multiple sites that differ in
their characteristics, the modern approach to the travel cost method, using
random utility models, allows estimation of the value of site characteristics,
which may include things like fishing quality or scenic beauty. In its most
common application, the hedonic method uses data on property sales to
statistically isolate WTP for the attributes of the properties. Among the
attributes may be environmental attributes such as the distance to open
space, access to scenic vistas, or ambient air quality. Of course, all relevant
attributes must be represented in the data in order to avoid incorrectly
estimating the value of the attributes that are included. Averting behavior
methods use peoples' expenditures to avoid potential health problems to
estimate WTP for improved health. Where these health problems are caused
by a loss of ecosystem services, the method can infer WTP for the service,
but typically the inference is only approximate because people can rarely
take actions that result in optimal protection levels, and because the
measure will underestimate WTP if the averting behavior costs less than the
individual is willing to pay.
The revealed preference methods each rely on somewhat
specialized situations (i.e., recreation trips, property sales, health effects)
and thus are limited in the ecosystem goods and services they can be used
to value. Stated preference methods do not face such constraints; in principle
they can be used to value any good or service, real or imagined. However,
these methods face their own set of difficulties, having to do with
respondents' ability to accurately predict (and willingness to reveal) their
own behavior and researchers' ability to construct meaningful and realistic
payment scenarios. Contingent valuation may be used to value a public
program, recreation experience, habitat condition, or any other policy-
relevant change. This method can zero in on a specific ecosystem good or
service as long as a realistic payment scenario can be posited. Not all goods
or services lend themselves to realistic payment scenarios; for example,
protection and management of open-access ecosystem services requires an
entity to enforce payment and control access, and if that entity does not
exist and is not likely to exist, a realistic payment scenario is not possible.
Attribute-based methods, also called conjoint or choice analysis methods,
typically ask respondents about a series of similar multi-attribute goods or
services that differ in the levels of their common attributes. In the most
common application, respondents are presented with several sets, usually
containing two or three items each, and asked for each set to choose the
item they prefer. For economic valuation, price must be one of the
attributes. Another of the attributes can be the environmental good or
service at issue. For example, the attributes of camping opportunities may
include natural scenic beauty in addition to camping fee and produced
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features such as quality of tent sites, availability of picnic tables, and ease
of access. Like contingent valuation, attribute-based approaches are quite
flexible in the kinds of goods or services they can be used to value but
require a realistic payment scenario.
Economic production function approaches are used to value inputs
in the production of a marketed good. These approaches require observing,
and perhaps modeling, the behavior of producers, including their response
to changes in environmental conditions that influence production of the
market good. The effect of the environmental change on the costs or output
level of the production process yields an estimate of the economic value of
the change. Production function approaches have several variants. One of
the simplest is to observe a set of producers that are similar in all aspects
except for the quantity or quality of some environmental input. Differences
in the level of output among these producers, and thus in their net
revenues, holding all other inputs constant, indicate the value of the
environmental input. Another, more complex approach is to carefully
model the behavior of firms under conditions that differ in the level of the
environmental input. For example, irrigated agricultural production may
be modeled as a way to estimate the value of increments in water
availability or quality to irrigated farming. Such modeling requires detailed
understanding of how firms respond to varying levels of their different
inputs, including the input of primary interest, the environmental
condition. A key requirement for using production function approaches is
that the output and the other inputs are competitively priced (e.g., subsidies
do not seriously affect their prices), or, if not competitively priced, the
market interference can be adjusted for.
Unlike the first three categories of methods, the replacement cost
method, also called the alternative cost method, does not rely on observing
or modeling the behavior of persons or firms as they respond to existing or
posited conditions. Rather, this method computes the cost of replacing a lost
environmental good or service, or conversely the replacement cost avoided
if the environmental good or service is preserved. Because the replacement
cost is a measure of cost, not of value, it is not truly a method for measuring
benefits.' However, the method -or, more precisely, the estimate of cost
that it entails-is commonly used with ecosystem services and thus
deserves a closer look.
34. The averting behavior method, described above, also relies on a measure of cost as an
indication of benefit. The averting behavior method enjoys more acceptance among economists
than does the replacement cost method because, in part, the averting behavior method relies
on observation of consumer behavior, in contrast to the replacement cost method, which relies
at best on the existence of a legislative mandate -a collective decision that only indirectly
reflects consumer desires.
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Although some applications of the replacement cost method seem
without merit,35 the following special case is especially deserving of
attention: when there are two substantially different options for achieving
the same goal and the second option is legislatively mandated and will go
forward unless the first option is implemented, the cost avoided by
achieving the goal using the first option may serve as a proxy for the
benefits of that first option.36 This is because the legislative mandate
requires that the costs of the second option will otherwise be incurred. In
this situation, an avoided cost can be treated as a benefit, as the money
saved becomes available for other uses.37 For example, if the first option
were to protect an ecosystem service and the second option were a
produced substitute, the cost of the produced substitute that would be
avoided if the ecosystem service were protected is a measure of the benefit
of that protection if laws require that the ecosystem service be replaced (by
the second option) if it is lost (and, of course, if the second option is a
perfect, or at least nearly perfect, substitute for the ecosystem service).
However, this special case is best viewed within the framework of
cost-effectiveness analysis, not benefit-cost analysis.38 That is, in the
presence of a legislated goal, a measure of the benefit of that goal is actually
beside the point -by law, the goal will be met. With a legislated goal, only
the costs matter, and the decision is simply one of comparing the costs of
the options for reaching that goal and choosing the least expensive option.
35. The replacement cost approach has been criticized, at least in part, because it can be
easily misused. The classic case of misuse occurs when, in an effort to support a proposed
project whose benefit is difficult to measure, the agency proposing the project simply searches
for a more expensive option for producing the same benefit and uses the cost of that option as
a measure of the benefit of their pet project. Correct use of the replacement cost approach relies
on satisfying two conditions. To consider them, assume two ways of achieving the same goal:
option 1 and option 2, each with associated costs (C1 and C2) and benefits (B1 and B2). When the
benefit of one option, B1, cannot be directly measured, the replacement cost method uses the
cost of the other option, C2, as a measure of B1. Although the cost C2 is not a measure of B1, C2
is considered a proxy for B1 if the following two conditions hold: (1) B2  B1 and (2) B2 ; C2. If
these conditions hold, clearly B1 2 C2, and C2 serves as a lower bound on B1.The main problem
in evaluating these conditions, of course, is estimating B2. If B2were known, and if it truly were
also an estimate of B1, then B1 would also be known and use of the method would not be
necessary. When B2 is not known, and condition 2 must be assumed, we have not necessarily
gained anything.
36. Peter 0. Steiner, The Role of Alternative Cost in Project Design and Selection, in WATER
RESEARCH 33,46 (Allen V. Kneese & Stephen C. Smith eds., 1966).
37. It is important to distinguish between the avoided (i.e., replacement) cost and the cost
savings. The replacement cost is considered the gross benefit of pursuing the first option. The
cost savings is the difference between the larger (replacement) cost and the lower cost.
38. This argument was first made by ORRIsC. HERFINDAHL & ALLEN V. KNEESE, EcoNoMIC
THEORY OF NATURAL REsouRcEs 267-70 (1974).
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Thus, in this special case we avoid the issue of whether an alternative cost
is actually a measure of benefit.39
The New York City water supply case is an example of the situation
just described, where water quality standards were mandated and the city
considered the option of protecting its Catskill watershed water source in
lieu of constructing and maintaining a filtration plant. The cheapest option
was to protect the watershed. Given the mandate to protect drinking water
quality, the benefit of protecting the watershed (to be compared with the
cost of watershed protection) can be considered at least as great as the cost
of building the filtration plant, but an estimate of benefit is beside the point
once the benefit is mandated and cost effectiveness is the only remaining
issue.
Based on a review of the literature, de Groot et al. tabulated the
methods that have been used to value different ecosystem goods and
services.' The overall impression from their survey is that the production
function approach has typically been used to value ecosystem goods and
the replacement cost method has typically been used to value ecosystem
services. The nonmarket approaches, about which so much has been
written, have typically found application for just a few of the ecosystem
goods and services.
V. PROVIDING AND FINANCING ECOSYSTEM
GOODS AND SERVICES
Many ecosystem services and some ecosystem goods are commonly
received for free. For example, water users downstream of a forested area
receive for free the water quality protection afforded by the forest, and
farmers receive for free the waste assimilation provided by the stream into
which their agricultural wastes drain. The marketing of ecosystem goods
and services is basically an effort to turn such recipients - those who benefit
without ownership -into buyers.41 Some formal arrangement, like
purchase, is needed to make this happen. Typically the sellers are
landowners where the good or service originates or the public via its
environmental laws. We consider these two cases in turn.
39. A situation where benefit-cost analysis is still relevant is where the benefit at issue is
one of several that make up the total benefit of the project, which is then compared to total cost.
For example, in benefit-cost analysis of a dam, the hydropower the dam could produce might
be valued using the cost savings in avoiding reliance on thermoelectric power, whereas the
recreation benefits might be valued using the travel cost method. Given a goal of economic
efficiency, the sum of these two benefits would need to exceed the cost of the dam.
40. de Groot et al., supra note 9, at 405-06.
41. Michael Jenkins et al., Markets for Biodiversity Services: Potential Roles and Challenges, 46
ENVIRONMENT 32, 41 (2004).
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In the first case, we may want to protect an ecosystem good or
service that is under the control of another party. For example, we may
want to continue to enjoy the view of a local forest or have access to clean
streamflow (which, let us imagine, would require averting the sediment
produced by an upstream rancher who is letting his cattle graze along the
stream). To assure the desired ecosystem protection in such situations, we
have two basic options: buy the land or, less expensively, arrange to pay
only for the ecosystem good or service we wish to enjoy (or for the
management change needed to protect the good or service). Various
arrangements are possible, including conservation easements and direct
payments for an agreed management change. In the second case,
individuals or firms who are enjoying access to the environment as a sink
for their waste products may be forced to pay for that privilege if environ-
mental laws restrict the right to pollute. Economic mechanisms include a
cap-and-trade scheme and a direct pollution tax or other charge. In both of
these cases the payments internalize externalities. In the former, benefi-
ciaries of a positive externality begin paying for the benefit; in the latter,
entities causing negative externalities begin paying for the harm they cause.
By internalizing externalities, payment provides signals that
encourage behavior more accurately reflecting the full value of the
resources at issue, thereby helping to ensure continued enjoyment of the
ecosystem good or service. This section focuses on the conditions that
enable or enhance opportunities for marketing of ecosystem goods and
services and on the mechanisms whereby the goods and services are
marketed. We begin by considering the basic conditions for exchange,
where exchange includes simple two-party agreements as well as exchanges
that occur within active markets.
A. Conditions of Exchange
1. Conditions That Allow Exchange
For exchange to occur for any good or service, three basic
conditions must exist (Table 3). First of all, the good or service must be
scarce. If a good or service is not scarce (i.e., if supply is unlimited relative
to demand), there is no incentive for anyone to pay for it because they can
get all they want for free. Currently this is an issue with some of the
ecosystem goods or services listed in Table 1, such as ambient air. In most
places, ambient air (air in the atmosphere) is not scarce; we can all breathe
as much air as we want for free. As long as ambient air is not scarce, no one
will pay for it in a private market.'
42. Although ambient air is not scarce, clean ambient air often is, especially in urban
areas.
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Table 3. Conditions of Exchange
Conditions that allow exchange
Scarcity
Non-attenuated property rights
Clear definition and precise measurement
Consistent and reliable enforcement
Excludability
Transferability
Low transaction costs
Ready market information
Inexpensive measurement, monitoring, and enforcement
Conditions that lead to a competitive market solution
Many buyers and sellers
Lack of third-party environmental effects
Rivalness
Ample identical units
Perfect information
Conditions that further improve the likelihood of exchange
Perceived fairness of transactions
Institutions aiding exchange (e.g., customs, brokers, banks)
A second requirement is the establishment of non-attenuated
property rights for the good or service. Non-attenuated property rights are
unambiguous, transferable, exclusive, and enforced. 3 Non-attenuated
property rights to normal commercial goods and services, such as bread or
tickets to a concert, are taken for granted because they are so obvious. Such
goods are easily defined and transferred, they belong solely to the owner,
and a person's right to such a good is unquestioned and protected via
widely available law enforcement. However, these characteristics are not so
easily established for many ecosystem goods and services.
Excludability of goods and services is discussed in detail below in
the section "Classification of Ecosystem Goods and Services." In this section
we focus on definition and measurement of ecosystem goods and services.
Definition and measurement of ecosystem goods is fairly straightforward,
but for ecosystem services definition and measurement can be a major
stumbling block. For example, the amount of water purification, or
conversely the amount of water pollution, that occurs on a given parcel of
land, either in soils or wetlands, is extremely difficult to quantify because
43. ALAN RANDALL, RESOURCE ECONOMICS: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO NATURAL
REsouRCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 157-58 (2nd ed. 1987).
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of the multiple points at which the water enters the stream." The issue is
further complicated by the fact that water quality is a matter of numerous
different constituents. If parties cannot agree on a measurement protocol or
do not have faith in the measurement that occurs, possibilities for exchange
are seriously compromised.
Enforcement of exchange agreements is another hurdle. With
ecosystem goods, contracts for delivery rely on fairly well-established laws
that are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. However,
arrangements for provision and financing of ecosystem services are often
fairly new and typically rely on unique rules announced by the
government. Such rules may be subject to change, leaving uncertainty in the
minds of private participants. If potential participants lack confidence that
the agreements will endure and be enforced, they may decline to participate
despite the announced benefits. For example, farmers may be enticed to
plant trees in place of annual crops on sensitive slopes with a promise of
future payments from a governmental agency, but if the farmers have any
doubt about the payments - perhaps because the agency's funding is
uncertain - they are likely to continue to plant their annual crops.
Once non-attenuated property rights are established for a scarce
good or service, as Coase showed, market trade will automatically develop
for the good or service as long as transaction costs are not excessive.45
Transaction costs include costs of getting information, finding willing sellers
or buyers, and transferring title, which are commonly borne by the parties
to the exchange. Transaction costs also include the underlying costs of
establishing and enforcing non-attenuated property rights to the good or
service, which are commonly borne by a governmental entity.' These
underlying costs may involve monitoring, either of environmental
conditions such as ambient water or air quality or of emissions of point- or
nonpoint-source pollution. If transaction costs borne by the parties to the
transaction exceed the benefits of the exchange, exchange will not occur. If
transaction costs borne by a government entity are excessive relative to the
perceived public benefits of the resultant transactions, exchange is also
unlikely to occur.
Assuming transaction costs are not prohibitive, private markets for
ecosystem services that achieve economic efficiency could theoretically
develop as envisioned by Coase.47 Economic efficiency is a common policy
44. This difficulty is one reason for the relative lack of success in the United States in
controlling nonpoint-source water pollution in contrast to point-source water pollution. See
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALM INVENTORY: 1994 REPORT TO CONGRESS
11-12 (1995), available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/94report/index.html.
45. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5-6 (1960).
46. See Alan Randall, The Problem of Market Failure, 23 NAT. RESOuRcESJ. 131, 133 (1983).
47. Coase, supra note 45, at 5-6, 8.
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and management goal with respect to providing and paying for any good
or service. Economic efficiency is generally defined as Pareto efficiency, a
situation in which it is not possible to reallocate production or consumption
in a way that makes one individual or group better off without making
another individual or group worse off.' Voluntary exchanges will naturally
enhance economic efficiency as long as all parties affected by the exchange
are party to the exchange (i.e., as long as externalities are not present).
Applying the strong version of the Coase Theorem, if transaction
costs are negligible, the final, economically efficient provision of ecosystem
goods and services will be independent of the initial assignment of property
rights.49 As an example, consider the ecosystem service of streamflow and
for simplicity assume there are two parties interested in the water, an
upstream party and a downstream party. The strong version of the Coase
Theorem would imply that the final economically efficient allocation of
water between the upstream party and downstream party resulting from
market trade of the water would be independent of the initial assignment
of property rights. Thus, we could assign initial water rights to either party
and then let market trade between the two lead to the unique economically
efficient allocation of water between the parties.
The weak - and more realistic - version of the Coase Theorem
drops the assumption of negligible transaction costs. Because of the
presence of positive (but not prohibitively high) transaction costs, the weak
version of the Coase Theorem implies that the final economically efficient
level of ecosystem goods and services will depend upon the initial
assignment of property rights. For example, consider again the upstream
and downstream parties in the example in the previous paragraph. Under
the weak version of the Coase Theorem, if water rights were initially
assigned to the upstream party, we would expect the final economically
efficient allocation of water resulting from market trade to favor the
upstream party (i.e., the upstream party would end up with more of the
streamflow than in the case of zero transaction costs). However, if water
rights were initially assigned to the downstream party, theoretically we
would expect the final economically efficient allocation of water resulting
from market trade to favor the downstream party. Whether we initially
assign water rights to the upstream or downstream party, the final
allocation of water between the two parties will be economically efficient.'
48. Freeman, supra note 25, at 15.
49. An additional condition is that income effects are negligible, where income effects
refer to increased (decreased) demand for ecosystem goods and services based on increased
(decreased) income resulting from who gets paid by whom for ecosystem goods and services.
50. See RANDALL, supra note 43, at 186-93; Randall, supra note 46, at 139.
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2. Conditions That Lead to a Competitive Market Solution
Isolated trades are not the only or even the most common
exchanges of ecosystem goods and services. Markets- institutions or
settings in which numerous individuals voluntarily trade units of a good or
service, typically using money as the means of exchange -are common.
Markets exist for many of the goods listed in Table 1. If the conditions
described above are met, and if a sufficient number of units of the good or
service are available, an active market may develop. Economic efficiency is
naturally enhanced through such markets if they are competitive. Voluntary
exchange, however, does not assure competitiveness.
Under competitive conditions, market price and the quantity traded
are such that the price is the point at which the marginal cost of providing
the good equals the marginal benefit of its consumption. Competitive
markets have several characteristics (Table 3), the most important for the
current discussion being that (1) they have many buyers and sellers, (2) they
internalize all costs and benefits (i.e., there are no externalities to a
transaction), and (3) the good or service is rival. Lack of any one of these
requirements will lead to inequality of marginal cost and marginal benefit,
and thus to inefficiencies. The "rival" characteristic is discussed in the
section "Classification of Ecosystem Goods and Services." Here we focus on
the number of participants and on externalities.
Markets lacking a sufficient number of participants may be
monopolistic or monopsonistic. In a purely monopolistic (monopsonistic)
market, a seller (buyer) would have such a strong hold on market supply
(demand) as to be able to set price at will with no concerns about
competitors stepping in to capture a larger share of the market. In a
competitive market, no individual or firm can control the price or the total
quantity offered for sale.
Technical externalities arise when a transaction leads to
environmental changes that affect individuals or firms not party to the
exchange. Externalities may be negative or positive. For example, when
water rights are transferred from one basin to another, water quality in the
river of origin may drop because there is less water to naturally assimilate
waste products, and water quality in the receiving river may rise because
there is more water for waste assimilation. Externalities are avoided if all
affected entities are involved in the transaction, but such involvement may
entail substantial transaction costs, and the mere opportunity for involve-
ment may depend on laws and environmental quality regulations
protecting third parties.
Only some ecosystem goods and services are amenable to provision
in relatively competitive markets. In other cases, as described in more detail
in the following section, "Classification of Ecosystem Goods and Services,"
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some government intervention is needed to move provision toward an
efficient outcome.
3. Conditions That Further Improve the Likelihood of Exchange
We have identified three general requirements for exchange to
occur-scarcity, non-attenuated property rights, and non-prohibitive
transaction costs-and additional conditions for competitive market
exchange. These requirements or conditions alone, however, are not
necessarily sufficient for exchange to occur. One potential hurdle is that,
because the gains from trade in an ecosystem good or service market will
depend on the initial allocation of rights, the resulting distribution of
resources and incomes may be viewed as unfair (Table 3). Inequity,
especially involving lower income providers of ecosystem services, is a
potential barrier to exchange, particularly if the exchange is of a good or
service with public good qualities."' Thus, for the long-term support and
sustainability of an ecosystem service market, passing an economic fairness
or social justice test may be another necessary condition.
Another impediment to market development is political, social, or
even moral opposition to the idea of trading an ecosystem good or service.
Some people, for example, hold the strong opinion that the public has
inherent rights to some ecosystem goods or services and that provision and
protection of these things should not be left up to private market
transactions. For example, many people may view access to clean air and
water as a fundamental human right and morally object to forcing people
to pay for this right through market transactions. This group would likely
rather see the government provide and protect clean air and water through
general tax revenues, regulation and pollution taxes under the "polluter
pays" principle. 2
Related to the matters of fairness and acceptability of exchange is
the question of negative externalities. The existence of either technical
externalities, mentioned above, or pecuniary externalities can lead to
opposition to exchange. Pecuniary externalities arise when a transaction
financially harms individuals or firms not party to the exchange. For
example, when water rights are transferred from one basin to another,
leading to a drop in water use in the basin of the seller, businesses or local
government agencies (and the services they provide) that relied on the
51. See Natasha Landell-Mills, Developing Markets for Forest Environmental Services: An
Opportunity for Promoting Equity While Securing Efficiency?, 360 PHiL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
Soc'y 1817, 1821 (2002).
52. Cf. RANDALL, supra note 43, at 360-64 (discussing Pigouvian tax and direct regulation
solutions to pollution problems).
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economic activity related to that water use may be harmed. 3 The existence
of either kind of externality may lead to legal and political opposition to an
exchange.'
Another factor that facilitates exchange is the presence of
institutions aiding exchange, such as laws and customs that treat the item
at issue as a marketable commodity, brokers that help bring buyers and
sellers together, and middle-men that buy the item from sellers and then
sell it to buyers. For example, water marketing in the western United States
is facilitated by laws and customs that allow for transfer of water rights, real
estate brokers that deal in water, and water banks that have no use for
water themselves but serve as a clearing house, temporarily holding
commitments for water delivery. 5
B. Classification of Ecosystem Goods and Services
The degree to which a good or service is rival and exclusive
determines the feasibility and appropriateness of different provision and
financing mechanisms, as well as the level to which government must be
involved to produce an economically efficient allocation. 6 A rival good is
one for which consumption by one person reduces the amount of good or
service available to others, as is the case with apples and haircuts. A non-
rival good or service is one for which consumption by one person does not
reduce the amount available to anyone else, as with radio signals, climate
regulation, and UV ray protection. 7 An exclusive good or service is one from
which consumers can be excluded unless they meet the conditions
prescribed by the party controlling the good or service. Goods offered for
sale are exclusive goods. Conversely, a non-exclusive good or service is one
from which consumers cannot be excluded, even if they do not pay for it.
A good or service may be non-exclusive because of its physical
characteristics and distribution. For example, natural water storage in soils,
lakes, and wetlands benefits all downstream riparian land owners and
water users in the form of flood control and paced release of water. It would
53. See, e.g., Charles W. Howe & Christopher Goemans, Water Transfers and Their Impacts:
Lessons from Three Colorado Water Markets, 39 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES Ass'N 1055,1064 (2003).
54. See, e.g., Ellen Hanak, Stopping the Drain: Third-Party Responses to California's Water
Market, 23 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 59, 60 (2005).
55. See generally A. DAN TARLOCK Er AL., NAT L RES. CoUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE
WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUrIY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 70-105 (1992) (describing the elements of
the law of water transfers).
56. RANDALL, supra note 43, at 164-69, 175-76.
57. For a non-rival good or service, "consumption" must be thought of in a broader,
passive sense. For example, in the absence of congestion, when a nature lover looks out over
a scenic view, he or she "consumes" enjoyment of the view without using up any of the
view- thus, a scenic view is a non-rival good.
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be very difficult for a private company or a government entity to establish
exclusive rights over this service and charge beneficiaries depending on
how much they benefit; thus, natural water storage is non-exclusive.
Crossing these bipolar dimensions, rivalry and exclusiveness, yields
four categories of goods and services: rival, exclusive; rival, non-exclusive;
non-rival, exclusive; and non-rival, non-exclusive. In the four cells of Table
4 we list some ecosystem goods and services that typically represent the
four categories.
Free market provision and financing of goods and services (i.e.,
with only minimal government involvement, for things like enforcement of
property rights) is best suited to rival, exclusive goods and services. As
shown in Table 4, most tangible ecosystem goods, but few services,
potentially can be traded efficiently in unfettered private markets. Private
markets, in fact, already exist for many of the rival, exclusive goods shown
in Table 4 (e.g., fossil fuels, timber, and big game hunting opportunities).
In the case of non-rival, exclusive goods and services (Table 4),
because exclusion can be established, private market provision is possible.
For example, a private land owner could fence off her land and charge
people who enter through a gate to view and photograph natural plants on
the land. As long as congestion is not a problem and people do not destroy
the plants they are viewing and photographing, use and "consumption"
will be non-rival. From an economic efficiency standpoint, however, the
private owner is likely to charge "too high" an entrance fee and turn away
"too many" people; that is, any entrance fee above the generally low
marginal cost of allowing one more person into the area to view plants
would be economically inefficient.
Many non-rival, exclusive recreational opportunities are provided
by the government. For example, Rocky Mountain National Park in
Colorado, although a large public park, has few automobile access points.
The Park Service controls access at these entry points and charges an
entrance fee. Thus, the Park Service has made recreational opportunities
within the park exclusive. Once inside the park, recreational opportunities
are non-rival if congestion is not a problem. However, when congestion sets
in (which it very much does on nice summer days), recreation opportunities
(such as hiking) can become rival (e.g., with people literally bumping into
each other on the hiking trials).5
58. The economically efficient price depends on the number of visitors. If the area were
truly non-rival, the fee would be very low, but if it were rival, as on a nice summer day, the
efficient fee would be high enough to avoid severe reduction of marginal benefits.
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Table 4. Ecosystem Goods & Services Classified by Rivalness &
Exclusiveness Characteristics
Exclusive
+ 4
* Nonrenewable ecosystem goods
extracted from contained (i.e.,
controlled-access) deposits (e.g.,
fossil fuels, metals, minerals)
" Renewable ecosystem goods
harvested from contained
ecosystems (e.g., water, fish,
wildlife, trees, fuel wood, edible
plants, medicinal plants)
" Consumptive recreation
opportunities (e.g., hunting,
fisig) on contained properties
* Non-consumptive recreation
opportunities (e.g., hiking,
viewing) on congested,
contained properties
• Ecosystem services the effects of
which are contained within a
property ownershi (e..,
maintenance of soi fertility)
Non-exclusive
• Renewable ecosystem
goods harvestedfrom
uncontained (i.e., open-
access) ecosystems (e.g.,
water, fish, wildlife, trees,
fuel wood, edible plants,
medicinal plants)
" Consumptive recreation
opportunities (e.g.,
hunting, fishing) on
uncontained properties
• Non-consumptive
recreation opportunities
(e.g., hiking, viewing) on
congested, uncontained
properties
• Ecosystem services the
effects of which are not
contained within a
property ownership but
are realized in the quality
of rival goods (e.g.,
erosion control, natural
water storage, waste
assimilation)
• Natural animal and plant
pest control and
pollination services
Non- Non-consumptive recreation • Non-consumptive
rival opportunities (e.g., hiking, recreation opportunities
viewing) on uncongested, (e.g., hiking, viewing) on
contained properties uncongested, uncontainedproperties
M aintenance of regionalprecipitati on patterns
* emperature maintenance
via carbon storage
• UV protection
• Ambient air purification
• Natural water storage as it
lowers the probability of
floods and droughts
Rival
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If exclusion is not feasible, economically efficient free market
provision and financing of goods and services are also not feasible. Indeed,
private markets of any type typically fail to develop for non-exclusive
goods and services, leading to their under-provision. For example, a
landowner with the capability to protect the quality of the streamflow
leaving his property will have little incentive to do so if his efforts are
enjoyed for free by those downstream-a situation known as the "free-
rider" problem. Therefore, goods and services that are non-exclusive are
typically regulated or provided by the government and financed with tax
revenues.
When an ecosystem good or service is non-exclusive because of its
physical nature and distribution, such as tuna fish in the open ocean and
temperature maintenance via carbon storage, correcting this situation-
making it exclusive-can be very expensive. Such costs are a form of
transaction cost. For example, the transaction costs of attempting to
privatize tuna in the open ocean and assigning non-attenuated property
rights to one or more owners would be prohibitive because of the physical
difficulties of containing tuna to a specific place in the ocean. In the case of
temperature maintenance via carbon storage, there are literally billions of
individual beneficiaries. The transaction costs to an individual provider of
these ecosystem services involved in securing payment from all
beneficiaries (or even a relatively small portion of these beneficiaries) would
be prohibitive.
Other ecosystem goods and services, such as recreational
opportunities provided in public parks on a no-fee basis, may for political
and cultural reasons be managed as non-exclusive even though the costs of
exclusion would not be prohibitive. For example, access to a city park may
be kept free to encourage community or for equity reasons (e.g., to avoid
letting ability to pay interfere with enjoyment of such a basic good).
Although some ecosystem services may be confined within a given
property and thus are exclusive (e.g., maintenance of soil fertility), most
ecosystem services are non-exclusive (Table 4). Non-exclusive ecosystem
services may be rival, as when their effects are realized, in part, in the
quality of rival goods (for example, waste assimilation in a river is realized
in the quality of the streamflow diverted for domestic use). However, many
non-exclusive ecosystem services are non-rival, such as maintenance of
precipitation and temperature patterns.
In summary, economically efficient free market provision and
financing is limited to rival, exclusive ecosystem goods and services. With
respect to the other three categories of ecosystem goods and services listed
in Table 4, self-organized markets for some of these goods and services
could develop, but the resulting prices and quantity of provision would be
economically inefficient. Because of problems related to non-rivalry or non-
exclusiveness, the ecosystem goods and services listed in the other three
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cells in Table 4 are likely subject to market failure defined as the failure of
private individual-buyer, individual-seller markets to achieve economic
efficiency or Pareto Efficiency in the provision and financing of goods and
services. Hence, the government is more likely to be involved in providing
these latter three categories of goods and services and financing them
through tax revenues or user fees (when it is feasible to exclude those who
do not pay the fee), or in regulating them via cap and trade or other
mechanisms.
C. Mechanisms of Exchange
Because ecosystem goods and services fall into all four cells of Table
4, they are subject to many different mechanisms of exchange. Ecosystem
goods such as trees and forage, being excludable physical inputs in
common production processes, are commonly purchased by those
intending to use them. Ecosystem services, such as natural flood regulation
and pollination, being generally non-excludable flows, are not directly
transferable. Because of this qu~lity, many ecosystem service flows are
typically protected by controlling or at least influencing the practices that
are allowed on the land where the services originate.
The most obvious way to constrain the practices permitted on a plot
of land is to own the land. When conservation-minded entities -either
public (e.g., the U.S. Forest Service, county open space programs) or private
(e.g., the Nature Conservancy, progressive individual landowners) -own
land, they may protect the ecological health of that land and thereby enable
the provision of ecosystem services. Nowadays additions to the set of
protected land typically occur either by market purchase or by set-asides of
what is already public land. Land purchases on the open market are
commonplace. Alternatively, existing public land may be moved to a more
restrictive category of use such as a wilderness designation.
Short of owning the land, ecological functions may be protected by
constraining the practices that are allowed on the land. Possible methods
include conservation easements, special use designation (e.g., designation
of a riparian area that includes private land as a Wild and Scenic River),
zoning, subsidies to land owners to follow certain practices, and
enforcement of environmental protection legislation such as the Clean
Water Act and the Endangered Species Act.59
59. In contrast to land and water resources, air quality protection is not so much a matter
of land ownership or management. Typically air quality protection has relied on taxes or
government regulations aimed at limiting emissions. Taxes have included excise taxes on use
of polluting fuels (e.g., gasoline). Regulations have taken a variety of forms including caps on
point-source emissions (e.g., SO2), temporary bans on use of some fuels when local air quality
drops below a threshold (e.g., wood burning bans), constraints on installation of offending
Spring 2007]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 47
Mechanisms for exchanging ecosystem goods and services fall into
the four general categories shown in Table 5. Private individuals (including
non-governmental organizations, firms, and other groups) can be either
buyers or sellers of ecosystem goods and services. Government entities
(including federal, state, and local governments) can also either be buyers
or sellers of ecosystem goods and services. Thus, the four general categories
for exchanging ecosystem goods and services are (1) individual buyer,
individual seller; (2) individual buyer, government seller; (3) government
buyer, individual seller; and (4) government buyer, government seller.
These four categories are discussed in more detail below.
Table 5. Provision & Payment Mechanisms for Ecosystem Goods & Services
Sellers
Individuals* Governments
- Markets for privately held ecosystem • Public goods and services
goods (e.g., crude oil, water in a financed by taxes (e.g.,
stream or aquifer, timber, gems, fee national parks, national
hunting and fishing, commercial forests, national wildlife
whitewater rafting) refuges, county or city open
- Private trust purchase of land or space, conservation
conservation easements (e.g., Nature easements)
Conservancy, Ducks Unlimited) • Fees to government agencies
Individuals* * Private environmental quality for access to ecosystem goods
incentive payments (e.g., Perrier- (e.g., timber harvesting,
Vittel, Trout Unlimited) energy and mineral extraction,
o Consumption-based donations (e.g., grazing, hunting, fishing,
green certification, wind power rate recreation opportunities)
Buyers premium, organically grown coffee) * Fees (taxes or charges) for
- Cap-and-trade markets (e.g., wetland license to discharge (e.g.,
credits, S02 permits, carbon permits pollution taxes) or use of a
and credits, land development polluting good (e.g., gasoline
rights) tax)
. Incentives to private parties for * Federal grants for
provision of ecosystem services (e.g., environmental protection (e.g.,
CRP, WRP, EQIP, FRPP, GRP, CSP, U.S. EPA water quality
Governments FEP) protection grants to local
- Land purchase governments, U.S. AID
ecosystem protection grants to
foreign governments)
* Firms and NGOs are categorized as individuals.
appliances (e.g., banning wood burning stoves in new construction), and fuel economy
standards for vehicles. In addition, government programs have subsidized alternatives to
polluting practices (e.g., public transportation) and funded research into improved
technologies.
ECOSYSTEM GOODS & SERVICES
1. Individual Buyer, Government Seller
Ecosystem goods and services are commonly financed via
individual tax payments to government entities that manage public land to
provide the goods and services. Non-excludable ecosystem goods and
services tend to be provided by government entities to users without direct
charge. For example, in the United States, the water quality protection
afforded by management of land as a national park or national forest is
available to downstream water users without charge, except for the tax
payment that enables the land management in the first place.
In the case of excludable ecosystem goods and services, fees may
be charged for use or access rights to an ecosystem good or service. For
example, in the United States, federal, state, and local governments charge
fees for many types of outdoor recreational opportunities (e.g., entrance fees
to public parks). In addition, states charge for fishing and hunting licenses.
In most cases, the money generated from outdoor recreation fees goes back
to protecting the ecosystems and natural resources that support the
recreational opportunities. The federal government in the United States also
charges fees for stumpage, grazing rights, and mineral and energy
extraction on public lands. Government fees are typically determined
administratively and may reflect a mixture of efficiency and equity
considerations.
Another individual-buyer, government-seller arrangement is the
so-called price-based approach to pollution control, whereby a
governmental entity imposes a tax or fee per unit of emission. Unlike a
quantity-based approach, such as the cap-and-trade approach described
below, a price-based program does not announce a precise limit on the
amount of pollution, either per emitter or in aggregate across all emitters;
rather, the program imposes a price, which may be amended periodically
so that the desired level of pollution control is approximated.' ° Such a fee
leaves decisions about the level of emissions and ways to limit emissions up
to the emitters, preserving individual flexibility to adapt, thereby containing
the overall cost of reducing emissions. An example of a price-based
approach is the 1993 law in Columbia that directs regional environmental
regulatory authorities to collect fees from individual wastewater emitters
per unit of biological oxygen demand and of total suspended solids that the
emitters add to rivers and streams.61 A price-based program has also been
60. Another difference between a price-based approach and cap and trade is that with the
former the complicated and contentious process of allocating permits to emitters is avoided.
61. Allen Blackman, Economic Incentives to Control Water Pollution in Developing Countries:
How Well Has Colombia's Wastewater Discharge Fee Program Worked and Why?, 161 REsOURcEs
20,22 (2006).
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proposed for worldwide control of greenhouse gases, where the fees would
be "harmonized" across countries via international negotiations in light of
the nations' different levels of economic development, in a manner similar
to that of tariff agreements in the international trade arena.62 The success of
such programs depends on the government's ability to monitor emissions
and collect the fees.
A somewhat different price-based instrument is a tax on
consumption of a commodity the use of which causes pollution, such as the
gasoline tax. Although in the United States the federal gasoline tax has not
been set with pollution control as the primary objective, the tax nevertheless
helps to discourage gasoline use and thereby limit pollution. Placing the tax
on consumption avoids the complicated process of monitoring individual
emissions.
2. Government Buyer, Individual Seller
Payments from government entities to individuals for the
protection of ecosystem services are generally known as subsidies or
incentive payments. The payments, often in the form of tax incentives or
cost sharing, induce landowners such as farmers and non-industrial forest
owners to alter their behavior in a way that benefits others. Such
arrangements are voluntary, naturally tend to be popular with recipients,
and increase economic efficiency as long as the benefits exceed the costs.
In the United States, many incentive programs are administered by
agencies of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, including the Natural
Resource Conservation Service and the Forest Service.63 Perhaps the best
known of these programs is the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),
under which selected landowners are paid to remove environmentally
sensitive cropland from production." Other, more recently established
USDA programs include the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), the
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), the Farm and Ranch
Lands Protection Program (FRPP), the Grasslands Reserve Program (GRP),
the Conservation Security Program (CSP), and the Forestland Enhancement
62. William D. Nordhaus, After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming,
96 AM. ECON. REV., May 2006, at 31, 31.
63. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Nat. Resources Conservation Serv., NRCS Conservation
Programs, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/PROGRAMS/; U.S. Dep't of Agric., Forest Serv., State
and Private Forestry, http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/. See also Thomas C. Brown et al., Laws and
Programs for Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution in Forest Areas, 29 WATER REsouRcEs BULL.
1, 5 (1993) (summarizing state forestry programs).
64. Zachary Cain & Stephen Lovejoy, History and Outlook for Farm Bill Conservation
Programs, 19 CHoIcES, 4th Q. 2004, at 37,40.
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Program (FEP).65 Of these seven programs, the CRP and WRP remove land
from agricultural production, whereas the other programs use payments to
improve management practices or establish easements to limit future
possible management practices on working agricultural landscapes.
Because these programs have only one buyer (the government
agency), an efficient solution will not result naturally. Because of the
difficulty of estimating the social benefits of the programs, to say nothing
65. For descriptions, acreages covered, and costs of the USDA programs, see U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIC., CONSERVATION AND THE ENvIRONMENT 5-8 (2006), available at www.usda.gov/
documents/FarmBill07consenv.doc. The CRP, established in 1985, originally focused on
erosion control but was later expanded to include wildlife habitat maintenance and other
objectives. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, tit. XH, §§ 1231-1236, 99 Stat. 1509
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3836 (2000)). Farmers receive an annual "rental"
payment plus partial reimbursement for the cost of planting and maintaining vegetation
(grasses, trees, and other cover crops), restoring wetlands, or establishing buffers. In 2005,
annual rental payments averaged $48 per acre, and payments for all purposes totaled $1.8
billion on 35 million acres. The WRP, established in 1990, uses cost-sharing and purchase of
easements to restore and preserve wetlands that have been converted to cropland. Food,
Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tit. XIV, § 1438,104 Stat.
3584 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 3837 (2000)). WRP payments totaled $161 million in
2005.
The EQIP, established in 1996 and consolidating several earlier programs, provides
cost sharing and other financial incentives to farmers who build structures and alter their
farming practices to improve air, soil, and water quality. EQIP payments totaled $444 million
in 2005 and involved 94.5 million acres. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127 tit. III, § 334,110 Stat. 996 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 3839aa
(2000)). FRPP, also established in 1996, provides financial help to state or local governments
or nonprofit organizations in purchasing conservation easements for the purpose of protecting
cropland by limiting nonagricultural uses of the land. FRPP payments totaled $112 million in
2005. Id. tit. III, § 388, 110 Stat. 1020 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 3830 n. (2000)). Thus far almost
450,000 acres have FRPP-assisted easements.
The GRP, established in 2002, makes rental payments to landowners or purchases
easements with the objective of restoring and protecting grasslands. Protected areas may
remain in livestock grazing but must be managed under an approved conservation plan. Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, tit. II, § 2401, 116 Stat. 258
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3838n-3838q (Supp. 2003)). The CSP, authorized in 2002, pays farmers
and ranchers for ongoing environmental stewardship on working lands and provides financial
incentives for them to adopt additional conservation practices, focusing on farmers and
ranchers who are proactively engaged in natural resource and environmental conservation and
stewardship practices that go above and beyond addressing current environmental problems
and regulations. Id. tit. II, §§ 2001-2006,116 Stat. 223 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 3838a
(Supp. 2003)). CSP payments totaled $206 million in 2005.
Finally, the FEP, established in 2002 and replacing two earlier forestry conservation
programs, provides cost sharing funds to non-industrial forest owners who develop and follow
a plan for sustainable forest management. Id. tit. VIII, § 8002,116 Stat. 468 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 2103 (Supp. 2003)). Similar programs exist in other countries, such as Costa Rica and Mexico,
which authorize payments to individual forest landowners to follow certain land conservation
practices. See Daily & Ellison, supra note 23, at 165-88.
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about the difficulties of obtaining efficient levels of funding, it is unlikely
that the programs will be funded at an economically efficient level. In any
case, funds are generally insufficient to enroll all parties wishing to
participate, and the programs use a variety of mechanisms for selecting
properties for participation and determining the payment amount and have
gradually moved toward more sophisticated methods of selecting
properties for participation as a way to improve the efficiency of use of
available funds. This may involve comparing potential participants on the
basis of the environmental benefits that participation would yield, the costs
of enrolling the property, or both. For example, landowners wishing to
participate in CRP now prepare a bid that includes both the benefits that
enrollment would provide -based on onsite characteristics such as the
slope and soil type of the property as well as offsite benefits such as
downstream erosion avoided or wildlife habitat improved - and the rental
payment that they require for participation. These benefit and cost features
are used to compute an environmental benefit index (EBI), a crude B-C
estimate, which CRP administrators then use to rank proposals for
selection, providing the greatest net benefit for the available funds.
3. Government Buyer, Government Seller
Governments may also pay (or subsidize) other governments to help
provide and protect ecosystem goods and services. For example, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency provides funds to local governments to
assist with development of wastewater treatment plants that help to protect
surface water and groundwater quality. The U.S. Agency for International
Development provides funds to foreign government entities to foster
resource conservation and environmental protection in their countries.
In the United States, situations where local or state governments
pay the federal government to provide and protect ecosystem goods and
services are uncommon, although such payments may make sense. For
example, a city may rely for its water supply on water flowing from a
national forest. The national forest may not have sufficient funding to
remove forest fuels to the extent necessary to significantly lower the risk of
serious wildfire. Such a wildfire could result in a decrease in water quality,
which in turn could impose costs on the city.66 It may make sense in such
a case for the city to contribute toward the costs of fuel treatment. For non-
excludable ecosystem services, government-to-government payments are
feasible because governments are the proper entities to provide such goods.
66. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'TOF AGmc., FORESTSERv., RocKY MTN. REs. STATION, HAYMAN FiRE
CASE STUDY 333 (Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114 (rev. 2003)) (listing costs imposed on the
Denver Water Board following the Hayman fire), availableathttp://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/
rmrsgtrl14.pdf.
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4. Individual Buyer, Individual Seller
There is much current interest in providing and financing
ecosystem services through new private markets characterized by
individual-buyer, individual-seller transactions.s7 Mechanisms where
individuals pay individuals include both familiar markets for rival,
exclusive ecosystem goods such as timber and mineral resources,
nontraditional arrangements to protect ecosystem services, and cap-and-
trade markets where permits or credits are traded.
Self-organized private markets and transactions with minimal
government involvement (except to establish and enforce property rights
and agreements) typically organize production and distribution of rival,
exclusive goods. As mentioned above, such markets have existed for many
years for many of the ecosystem goods listed in Table 1, ranging from
global markets for crude oil, timber, precious gems, and wildlife-related
products (e.g., furs, ivory) to local markets for water and some forms of
commonly available recreation. Some of these markets are very competitive,
but others, sometimes called "thin markets," lack a sufficient number of
buyers or sellers to be considered competitive.68
67. For a recent popular book on the use of market mechanisms to protect and pay for
ecosystem services, see DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 23, at 19-34. Daily and Ellison describe the
Katoomba Group, a dedicated, informal group of people from academia, government agencies,
and private business who share a vision of a world where ecosystem services are bought or
sold in economic markets akin to the New York Stock Exchange. The Katoomba Group has
helped to launch a web site with the purpose of facilitating ecosystem service markets by
providing a clearinghouse for information on prices, regulation, science, and other issues
related to ecosystem markets at www.ecosystemnarketplace.com. Id. Other authors are more
cautious on the prospect of markets for ecosystem services, considering economic efficiency,
sustainability, and equity issues. See generally Landell-Mills, supra note 51; Jim Salzman, The
Promise and Perils of Payments for Ecosystem Services, 1 INT'LJ. INNOVATION & SUSTAINABLE DEv.
5, 9-16 (2005) (exploring "disturbing policy implications" of ecosystem service markets).
68. The global market for crude oil is considered an uncompetitive market with relatively
few sellers and many buyers. Some of the relatively few sellers in the global market for crude
oil have formed a powerful cartel (OPEC) that can control the world supply and price of crude
oil. The uncompetitive nature of the global crude oil market leads to economic inefficiency in
the provision and price of crude oil (e.g., supply is lower and price is higher than they would
be in a competitive market). The global market for timber is considered a competitive market
with many sellers and buyers; no single block of buyers and sellers currently controls world
supply and price of timber. Thus, provision and price of timber will be more economically
efficient. Compare, e.g., Mehdi Noorbaksh, Foreign Pol'y Ass'n, Analysis: The Price of Oil,
http://www.fpa.org/topics-info2414/topics info_show.htm?doc_id=436343 (last visited Feb.
27, 2007); U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Outlook 2006,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/oil.html (last visited Feb 27, 2007) (OPEC production
decisions determine prices) with BRENT SOHNGREN, AN ASSESSMENT OF FOUR LARGE SCALE
TIMBERMARKETMODELS3 (1998), http://www-agecon.ag. ohio-state.edu/people/sohngen.1/
forests/modcomp.pdf ("prices will equilibrate demand and supply").
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Established markets with self-organized private transactions exist
for many recreational opportunities, including those for hunting, fishing,
69
and whitewater rafting.7' To take hunting as an example, private markets
have existed for hunting opportunities for many years. The typical hunting
market arrangement is one where an individual or group of individuals
leases hunting rights on private land for a negotiated payment to the
landowner. In some regions of the United States, there are many hunters
(buyers) and many landowners (sellers) willing to lease hunting rights;
thus, prices of private land hunting leases are fairly competitive. The rival,
exclusive nature of markets for hunting, fishing, and rafting opportunities
means that provision and price of these opportunities may be economically
efficient, although lack of supply sometimes limits the number of suppliers
so that prices are higher than marginal operating costs.
In recent years, markets with self-organized private transactions
have developed for scenic landscapes. For example, private land trusts have
been established that purchase conservation easements from private
landowners to protect scenic landscapes from development. The price of a
conservation easement is negotiated between the trust and the landowner.
In a particular area, there are likely to be only one or few land trusts
(buyers) who have the legal authority and funds to purchase conservation
easements, but many landowners (sellers) who would like to sell
conservation easements. Transaction costs are substantial in setting up a
trust and successfully negotiating a purchase. Because of the limited
number of buyers, the market for such conservation easements is likely to
be uncompetitive.
Another type of individual-to-individual mechanism is that of
private organizations granting funds to private individuals or groups to
69. With respect to saltwater fishing, an individual or group of individuals may charter
a boat and crew to go fishing in a saltwater bay or the ocean. There are typically many
saltwater anglers (buyers) and charter boats and crews (sellers), so the price of a charter is
fairly competitive. With respect to freshwater fishing, an angler may pay the owner of a private
pond for the right to fish in the pond. Payment to the pond owner is usually a price per fish
or per pound of fish caught. Because there are typically many freshwater anglers (buyers) and
pond owners (sellers), the price per fish or pound per fish caught is fairly competitive.
70. Commercial outfitters provide white water rafting opportunities to clients who pay
a fee per head to participate in a guided white water rafting trip down a river. In some parts
of the United States, there are only a few commercial outfitters (sellers) and many people who
would like to go rafting (buyers). In these cases, the market is likely to lack competition with
resulting economic inefficiency (e.g., rafting prices will be too high and too few opportunities
will be offered). Rationing of rafting opportunities by government agencies that control river
access (e.g., National Park Service, U.S. Forest Service) may also limit rafting opportunities
resulting in high prices. In other parts of the United States, there may be many commercial
outfitters (sellers) and many potential clients (buyers). In these cases, the market is likely to be
fairly competitive and economically efficient.
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provide and finance ecosystem goods and services. For example, Trout
Unlimited provides grants to landowners to help improve trout stream
habitat, and the World Wildlife Fund provides grants to landowners to
protect many different types of wildlife and wildlife habitat. Other private
conservation groups provide grants to purchase land to protect unique
ecosystems and biodiversity (e.g., tropical rainforests). The amount of a
private grant to protect ecosystems and provide goods and services may
involve some negotiation between the donor organization and recipient.
Grant amounts, however, are constrained and heavily determined by the
amount of money a private organization has to give. Most private
organizations depend on donations from private individuals for their
funding. Economic theory suggests that donation mechanisms will not
provide an economically efficient level of funding for ecosystem goods and
services because of free-riding.7' Many people are unwilling to contribute
toward the provision of public goods, especially if they know that others
will also avoid paying -hence the role for government in enforcing
payment and then providing public goods.
Self-organized private transactions for water are not common, but
are occurring. Perhaps the most famous case is that of Perrier-Vittel, the
bottled water company, which spent several million dollars to alter the
farming practices in the watershed affecting the quality of the springs
where the firm acquires its water.72 In the western United States, 150 market
sales or leases of water for environmental purposes (generally for
maintaining instream flow) were reported during the period 1990 to 2003.73
Most of these purchases were by government agencies, but 14 were by
private environmental organizations, and in 13 of those cases the sellers
were farmers or other private parties.
Another category of individual-to-individual transactions involves
price premiums for commercial goods paid by consumers who want to
encourage or reward environment-friendly production methods. These
premiums are essentially donations. For example, it is now common for
power companies to offer electricity customers the opportunity to pay a
premium in support of wind power. The companies use the donations to
cover the production cost differential between traditional thermal and wind
power. The wind-generated power is fed into the electricity grid so that all
customers receive a mixture irrespective of whether they paid the price
premium. Price premiums often are associated with certification programs
71. Patricia A. Champ et al., Using Donation Mechanisms to Value Nonuse Benefitsfom Public
Goods, 33 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 151, 152-53 (1997).
72. DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 23, at 65-66.
73. Thomas C. Brown, Trends in Water Market Activity and Price in the Western United States,
42 WATER RESOURCES RES. W09402, at 5 tbl.2 (2006).
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warranting that the goods were indeed produced using such methods. For
example, the Forest Stewardship Council certifies timber operations that
follow approved production and harvesting practices, and coffee grown
organically, certified as such, receives a price premium.74 In the forestry
case, the end product is essentially the same regardless of the production
methods, so that the premium is totally a donation, whereas in the coffee
case the consumer receives not only the satisfaction of having encouraged
eco-friendly production but also may directly benefit from the improved
product.
5. Cap-and-Trade Programs
A widely used approach to control negative externalities is that of
cap and trade. These programs utilize permits to emit a regulated pollutant
or credits that offset (i.e., mitigate or compensate for) the emission. Cap and
trade is listed with individual-to-individual trades in Table 5 because
permits or credits are indeed traded among individuals, but unlike the
other types of individual-to-individual trades, cap-and-trade programs
require substantial government involvement.
With a cap-and-trade program, a government entity (1) imposes an
aggregate limit or cap on some emission or'activity, (2) distributes permits
for the specified amount of emission or activity and allows individuals or
firms to trade the permits under certain institutional rules or allows credits
to be obtained and traded that allow a specified amount of emission, and
(3) monitors the emissions or activity in question and assesses a penalty if
an individual's emissions exceed those allowed given their permits or
credits. The ecosystem protection under such a program occurs with setting
and enforcing the cap (thus cap and trade is known as a quantity-type
approach). The trade part of cap and trade then allows firms in aggregate
to most cost-effectively reach the cap. With permit schemes, firms that can
lower their emissions at low cost do so and sell their permits to firms for
which the cost of cutting emissions is higher than the cost of purchasing
permits. With credit schemes, firms that desire to exceed their individual
limits must purchase credits that offset the increase in emissions.
As with the price-type approach mentioned above, cap and trade
relies critically on the ability to accurately monitor emissions or impacts.
Monitoring may focus on outputs (e.g., SO2 leaving power plant smoke
stacks), inputs (e.g., quantity purchased of a certain pesticide), or change in
environmental conditions (e.g., acres of wetland of a certain quality). Many
factors affect the feasibility of cap and trade and the choice of monitoring
strategy, including the availability of measurement technology and the
74. DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 23, at 112 (timber); Julie Grossman, Coffee FAQ,
http://people.cornell.edu/pages/jmg225/coffee.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
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number and locations of emissions or changes.7' Cap and trade also relies
on the government's willingness and ability to assess penalties for
noncompliance.
Cap and trade is being used in several important programs,
including the U.S. effort to control acid rain by limiting SO2 emissions.76 Fossil
fuel electric power plants are issued permits by the U.S. EPA for a certain
amount of SO2 emissions. The initial cap was set in 1995 for the eastern United
States; in 2000 the program was extended to the rest of the United States. The
permits may be traded among the utilities, either in private transactions or
during a government-sponsored auction. Compliance is encouraged via a
penalty per ton of emissions that exceed the permitted level.
One of the most well-established cap-and-trade credit markets in
the United States involves wetland mitigation banks. Conversion of
wetlands to non-wetlands (e.g., draining wetlands for development) is
regulated under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. In 1989 President H.W.
Bush capped wetland losses with a policy of "no net loss." The no-net-loss
policy for wetlands stipulates that if development of a property causes the
loss of wetlands, the developer must mitigate the loss by providing new
wetlands or enhancing an existing wetland. The no-net-loss policy
precludes the issuance of tradable permits but creates a role for credits. The
new wetlands do not have to be on the same property. The task of finding
a new wetland is facilitated by wetlands banks, which are large constructed
wetlands created for the purpose of providing future offsets for
developers.7 Wetland banks are available in all states of the United States.7'
Credits in a wetlands bank are created when a person or business creates
new wetlands and sells the credits to the bank. Interaction between buyers
and sellers through the wetlands bank generates a market price for
75. See Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal Design
Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the European Union's
CO 2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 865, 902
(2006).
76. See generally Robert N. Stavins, Lessons Learned from S02 Allowance Trading, 20 CHOICES
53 (2005); Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from
S02 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSPEcTIvEs 69 (1998).
77. See generally Leonard Shabman & Paul Scodan, The Future of Wetlands Mitigation
Banking, 20 CHOICES 65 (2005). A no-net-loss program could also operate without a bank or
market for credits. Absent those aids, the developer would have to mitigate the wetland loss
by directly creating a wetland (and perhaps buying the land on which the new wetland would
sit) or paying another landowner to do so. The purpose of the bank is to lower the cost of
complying with the no-net-loss policy by lowering the cost of finding a viable wetland credit
possibility.
78. Alan Randall & Michael A. Taylor, Incentive-Based Solutions to Agricultural
Environmental Problems: Recent Developments in Theory and Practice, 32 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON.
221, 226 (2000).
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wetlands credits. Although there may be many buyers (developers) for
wetland credits, typically there are few sellers (suppliers of new wetlands),
so markets for wetlands credits tend to be less than competitive.
Cap-and-trade markets also include the emerging international
market for carbon initiated by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.79 The Kyoto Protocol
created scarcity for carbon emission permits when signatory countries agreed
to reduce their emissions. The protocol allows a market that essentially
combines permits with credits. In a country with a binding carbon cap, if a
new business activity generates carbon emissions that would cause the cap
to be exceeded, these new emissions must be balanced either by purchasing
emission permits from other parties or by obtaining credits. Credits can be
earned by reducing carbon emissions somewhere else (perhaps by assisting
another party to improve energy use efficiency) or creating a sink that will
sequester carbon (perhaps via reforestation). Because rising atmospheric
carbon is a global problem, trading may occur across countries. Specific rules,
called the Marrakesh Accords, were recently agreed upon among Kyoto
signatories for operation of carbon credit markets.'
Another type of cap-and-trade market is that for transferable
development rights (TDR). In the United States, TDR programs are typically
implemented at the county level, where the county government places a cap
on development in the county through land use planning and regulations.
In one approach, a development located in a designated high-density area
would need to purchase development rights from a low-density
development area, such as an area of farms and open-space that provide
ecosystem goods and services. The purchase of development rights from
the low-density area keeps that area in low-density development. The price
of development rights is determined by interaction between buyers and
sellers with government oversight. Of course, as with other markets, for a
TDR market to approach the level of economic efficiency possible in a
purely competitive market, there must be many buyers (developers) and
sellers (land owners willing to give up development rights on their land for
a price).
D. Likelihood of Market Exchange
Much of the current interest in developing markets for ecosystem
goods and services is driven by the desire to move provision and financing
79. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1), available at http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G98/601/15/IMG/ G9860115.pdf?OpenElement.
80. Odd Godal & Ger Klaassen, Carbon Trading Across Sources and Periods Constrained by
the Marrakesh Accords, 51 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 308, 308 (2006).
[Vol. 47
ECOSYSTEM GOODS & SERVICES
of ecosystem goods and services away from mechanisms with heavy
government involvement toward those relying less on governments and
more on private market exchange (e.g., individual-to-individual trans-
actions). We summarize the potential for private market exchange of
ecosystem goods and services by considering a selection of these goods and
services in light of some of the major conditions for market exchange (Table
6). Ecosystem goods-including, for example, oil, timber, water for
diversion, and developed recreation opportunities - tend to be measurable,
excludable, and rival. Further, confidence is high that exchange contracts
will be enforced and, with the exception of water for diversion (which
requires complicated monitoring), their exchange tends to incur relatively
low transaction costs. Thus, as indicated in Table 6, the likelihood of market
exchange with minimal government involvement for many ecosystem
goods is relatively high. Where these goods present problems is with
externalities. For example, use of oil leads to air pollution and global
warming, harvest of timber alters habitats and lowers scenic beauty, at least
in the short-run, and downstream water users bear the cost of upstream
diversions.
Dispersed recreation opportunities on public land are an unusual
ecosystem good in that such opportunities are typically not excludable
without substantial effort. Attempts to charge people for taking advantage
of dispersed recreation would incur substantial transaction costs in the form
of administering the exclusion policy. Thus, as indicated in Table 6, the
likelihood of market exchange with minimal government involvement is
fair to poor.
Ecosystem services, assuming that they are enjoyed beyond the
specific property where they originate, show a decidedly different pattern
from ecosystem goods (Table 6). Negative externalities are largely absent
with ecosystem services." However, on all other criteria the services do not
easily lend themselves to market exchange. They typically are non-
excludable and non-rival and thus require some government involvement
if markets are to be established and sustained. Further, the task faced by the
government agencies would be formidable and expensive due to the
difficulty of defining and measuring the services and monitoring
compliance with any scheme established for protection and marketing.
Consider, for example, water purification and flood mitigation in
the context of wetland protection. Wetlands both purify water and help
mitigate floods. Lack of excludability from the benefits of wetlands led to
government involvement in wetland protection. Federal, state, and local
81. Negative side-effects of ecosystem services, although generally minor, may exist,
including, for example, bee stings during natural pollination and the presence of bothersome
species as part of biodiversity maintenance.
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governments have responded with both subsidies (e.g., the federal
Wetlands Reserve Program) and regulation (e.g., the U.S. no-net-loss
policy). Regarding the no-net-loss policy, difficulties in defining wetlands
have led to failures to comply with the policy and to expensive court cases
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over the extent of federal control.82 Difficulties in measuring and monitoring
the functions provided by a wetland have led to uncertainty about whether
constructed wetlands are sufficiently mitigating natural wetland loss.83 The
complex administrative tasks of inspecting each wetland proposed for
conversion and monitoring compliance with the policy, plus the burdens
imposed on developers who must understand and determine how to
comply with the regulations, result in high transaction costs. The WRP
incentive program is also not without its difficulties, as it also faces the
problems of definition and measurement, and the expense of monitoring.
We mention some of the difficulties with market exchange of
ecosystem services not to discourage government involvement in helping
to establish such market or market-like exchange, but rather to highlight the
need for adequately funding whatever program is instituted, and thus also
to note the importance of verifying beforehand that the benefits of a
government program are worth the costs. Ecosystem goods and services
with fair to poor potential for market exchange, indicated in Table 6, will
require more intensive government involvement and expense to establish
and sustain market or market-like exchange mechanisms.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have defined and characterized ecosystem goods and services,
described why they are of economic value, briefly reviewed methods for
quantifying that economic value, and examined the prospects for provision
and marketing of ecosystem goods and services. We stress that ecosystem
goods and services are those that arise "naturally" from natural capital,
with little human input other than the effort to protect the ecosystem from
degradation, that ecosystem goods and services are distinct from the
underlying ecosystem processes upon which the goods and services rely,
and that as our understanding of ecosystem processes improves we may
add to the list of ecosystem services.
Ecosystem goods and services improve human well-being by either
directly or indirectly affecting our utility. Indirect effects occur as ecosystem
goods and services serve as inputs in the production of other goods or
services of value to humans. The direct effects on human well-being often
can be monetized using stated preference techniques such as contingent
valuation and attribute-based methods, or the replacement cost approach.
82. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson:
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1 (1999).
83. Randall & Taylor, supra note 78, at 226. The approach used to compensate for the
difference between the lost wetland and substitute wetland has been to use roughly estimated
mitigation ratios specifying how many acres of constructed wetlands are needed per acre of
natural wetland loss.
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The indirect effects on human well-being are more likely to be quantified
using production function or replacement cost methods. An important
economic issue that these methods can help with is the quantification of the
costs of loss or degradation of ecosystem goods and services, as
foreknowledge of these costs may show that ecosystem protection is the
more efficient social choice.
As ecosystem goods and services become scarcer, the values of
most will increase. The rising scarcity and value of ecosystem goods and
services will enhance opportunities for their provision and marketing,
assuming that proper legal frameworks and marketing mechanisms exist.
Marketing is particularly likely for ecosystem goods and services from
which the owner can exclude non-payers and therefore fully capture the
revenues associated with supplying the goods and services. However,
many ecosystem goods and services, especially services, are non-
excludable, and also non-rival. For these ecosystem services, like
maintenance of habitats, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for private
competitive markets to emerge that will efficiently supply them. With non-
excludable and non-rival ecosystem goods and services, if the benefits of
protecting the natural capital outweigh the costs, public financing through
taxes may be necessary to ensure an optimal protection of the natural
capital upon which an efficient supply of ecosystem goods and services
depends. We survey several such public markets in which the government
pays individual landowners or other governments for ecosystem goods and
services.
The increasing scarcity of ecosystem goods and services will also
lead to the development of additional substitutes. Generally, opportunities
for developing adequate substitutes are greater for ecosystem goods and
services that are inputs to the production of other goods and services; the
likelihood of providing adequate substitutes for others, especially those
ecosystem services that enter the utility function directly, is much lower. A
key question before society and policy makers today is whether the human
creativity and vigor that threatens the natural capital upon which ecosystem
goods and services depend can be harnessed to design institutions and
incentive mechanisms to maintain natural capital and ecosystem goods and
services into the future. The growing awareness of the importance of
ecosystem goods and services, not only among scientists but also among
policy makers, offers hope that effective policies will be forthcoming.
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